The Rights of Public Employees to Speak Out on Job Related Issues (Connick v. Myers) by Mansfield, Thomas
Masthead Logo
NYLS Journal of Human Rights
Volume 2
Issue 2 Volume II, Part Two, Spring 1985 Article 5
1985
The Rights of Public Employees to Speak Out on
Job Related Issues (Connick v. Myers)
Thomas Mansfield
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights
Part of the Law Commons
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal
of Human Rights by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Thomas (1985) "The Rights of Public Employees to Speak Out on Job Related Issues (Connick v. Myers)," NYLS Journal of
Human Rights: Vol. 2 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_human_rights/vol2/iss2/5
COMMENTS
THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES TO SPEAK OUT ON JOB RE-
LATED ISSUEs-Connick v. Myers - Since its landmark decision
in Keyishian v. Board of Regents,1 the Supreme Court has up-
held the principle that a public employee's constitutionally guar-
anteed right to freedom of expression cannot be infringed simply
because he is a government employee.2 The Court has also rec-
ognized that ordinary dismissals from public employment are
not subject to judicial review if no fixed tenure agreement or ap-
plicable statute has been violated.3 In Pickering v. Board of Ed-
ucation,4 the Court held that in analyzing alleged infringements
of public employees' constitutional rights courts must seek:
a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interests of the state, as an employer, in promot-
ing the efficiency of the public services it performs
through its employees.5
In Connick v. Myers,6 the Court interpreted and applied the
Pickering approach in an extremely narrow fashion which raises
considerable doubt regarding the protection to be accorded the
first amendment rights of public employees in the future.
Connick arose out of the discharge7 of Sheila Myers from
her position as an Assistant District Attorney in New Orleans.
1. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
2. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
3. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593 (1972).
4. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
5. Id. at 568.
6. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
7. The term "discharge" will hereinafter be used to denote employees being fired
and, in the case of non-tenured positions, not having their contracts renewed.
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Myers was allegedly discharged by District Attorney Harry Con-
nick for refusing to accept a transfer to a different section of the
criminal court, and for distributing a questionnaire to the other
Assistant District Attorneys in the office.8 The questionnaire
consisted of thirteen questions about office discipline, morale
and grievances.9 After being discharged, Myers brought suit al-
leging that she had been wrongfully discharged for engaging in
constitutionally protected speech. 10
The district court ordered that Myers be reinstated and re-
ceive backpay, damages and attorney's fees." The court found
that the questionnaire, not the alleged refusal to accept the
transfer, was the real reason for Myers' discharge. The court
held that the questionnaire involved matters of public concern
and that the State had not clearly demonstrated that the ques-
tionnaire "substantially interfered" with the operations of the
District Attorney's office.12 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit affirmed on the basis of the district court's opinion.13
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, reversed." The Court
reiterated its support for the principle that "a state cannot con-
dition public employment on a basis that infringes an em-
ployee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expres-
sion"' 8 and stated that the balancing test set forth in Pickering
should be applied to this case.
8. 461 U.S. at 141-42.
9. Id. The district court summarized the questionnaire as follows: "Plaintiff solicited
the views of her fellow Assistant District Attorneys on a number of issues, including
office transfer policies and the manner in which information of that nature was commu-
nicated within the office. The questionnaire also sought to determine the views of Assist-
ants regarding office morale, the need for a grievance committee, and the level of confi-
dence felt by the Assistants in their supervisors. Finally, the questionnaire inquired as to
whether the Assistants felt pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office-
supported candidates." Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758 (E.D.La. 1981). The full
text of the questionnaire can be found in Appendix A of the Supreme Court opinion. 461
U.S. at 155.
10. 461 U.S. at 141.
11. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 760.
12. Id. at 759.
13. 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 455 U.S. 999
(1982).
14. 461 U.S. 138 (1983). Justice White wrote the majority opinion. Justice Brennan
wrote the dissent and was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Connick
also appealed the assessment of damages as being in violation of the eleventh amend-
ment and objected to the award of attorney's fees. Due to the Court's disposition of the
case it did not reach these issues. See id. at 142 n.3.
15. Id. at 142.
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Pickering involved a high school teacher who was dismissed
for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the Board of
Education about its funding and revenue raising policies.1 6 In re-
versing the decision to dismiss Pickering, the Court described its
approach not as a "general standard against which all such
statements may be judged," but as an outline of the "general
lines along which analysis of the controlling interests should
run."17
For most of this century it was an accepted principle that a
public employee had no right to object to conditions being
placed upon the terms of his employment even if those condi-
tions restricted his exercise of constitutional rights. This rule,
known as the right/privilege doctrine, is based on the theory
that since public employment is offered as a privilege rather
than a right it can be accompanied by conditions which restrict
the employee's rights." The classic and oft-quoted formulation
of this doctrine was made by Justice Holmes, who, when sitting
on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, stated: "A po-
liceman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he
has no constitutional right to be a policeman.
9
The Supreme Court applied this principle to cases involving
the political activities of government employees,20 loyalty oath
requirements,2 ' and the right of government employees and
Congressmen to receive money for political purposes from gov-
ernment officials and employees.2 By the early 1960's, however,
16. 391 U.S. at 566.
17. Id. at 569. The Court also noted that there is a considerable difference between
an employee speaking as a citizen and speaking as an employee. Id. at 574.
18. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
19. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 220, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (1892).
20. See United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (upholding the consti-
tutionality of the Hatch Act which restricts the political activities of federal employees).
21. See Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (upheld Los Angeles
ordinance requiring employees to sign affidavits stating they are not presently and were
not previously members of the Communist Party). See also Adler v. Board of Educ., 342
U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (if teachers "do not choose to work on such terms [as the State
requires], they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere").
22. See United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930) (upheld statute forbidding
Congressmen from soliciting political campaign funds from government employees); Ex
Parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882) (upheld statute forbidding non-appointed executive
officers from receiving money from any government employees).
19851
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the right/privilege doctrine had been rejected. Although in 1952
the Court held that a state could not force its employees to deny
past affiliation with the Communist Party,2" it was not until
1963 that the Court declared that it was "too late in the day to
doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be in-
fringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit
or privilege." 24 Connick states that "it was therefore no sur-
prise" that in Keyishian the Court invalidated New York stat-
utes denying government employment to individuals having
membership in "subversive" organizations.25
After reviewing the demise of the right/privilege doctrine
and the corresponding expansion of the constitutional rights of
public employees, Connick emphasizes that the pre-Pickering
cases dealt with the right of public employees to participate in
"public affairs."2 6 According to the Court, the issue in those
cases was whether public employee expression could be "chilled"
23. Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (in striking down an Oklahoma statute,
the Court distinguished earlier cases saying the statutes previously in question required
actual knowledge of disloyal activity while the Oklahoma law required only membership
in certain organizations to warrant dismissal).
24. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). The Court has applied the analo-
gous "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine in other areas of constitutional law since the
early 1930's. This doctrine held that the government is forbidden from doing indirectly
what it cannot do directly. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n., 271
U.S. 583, 594 (1926) ("If the State may compel the surrender of one Constitutional right
as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is incon-
ceivable that guarantees embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence"). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-
Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HAsv. L. REv. 1439 (1968).
25. 461 U.S. at 144. It should be noted that Justice White, who wrote the majority
opinion in Connick, joined Justice Clark's Keyishian dissent disputing the Keyishian
majority's claim that the constitutional doctrine that had emerged since Adler v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 had rejected its right/privilege premise. The dissent asserted that
"with due respect ... our cases have done no such thing." 385 U.S. at 625. Justice
Clark's dissent also stated that the issue in that case, New York statutes requiring state
employees to take loyalty oaths denying membership in the Communist and other "sub-
versive" parties, did not involve "freedom of thought, freedom of press, freedom of as-
sembly, or of association, even in the Communist Party." Id. at 628.
26. 461 U.S. at 144-45. The Court also cited Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484
(1957) and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964), for the principle that
the first amendment "was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the
bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people." 461 U.S. at 145.
The Court continued with a quote from Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964):
"[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government." 461 U.S. at 145.
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by the fear of discharge for joining political parties and other
associations considered subversive by their supervisors.2 The
Court finds these cases especially useful since they highlight the
"Constitution's special concern with threats to the right of citi-
zens to participate in political affairs. 28 The Court states "that
speech on public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierar-
chy of first amendment values,' and is entitled to special protec-
tion. '29 The reason for the Court's somewhat repetitious account
of the importance of the right to participate in and speak out on
public affairs soon becomes apparent, for the Court concludes
"that if Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as
constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unneces-
sary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge."30
The Pickering test only applies to speech "upon matters of
public concern."31 Therefore, it would appear that the employee
has the burden of proving that the speech in question involved a
matter of public concern. Practically all of the lower court deci-
sions applying the Pickering test have interpreted this require-
ment broadly.3 2 Thus, even if a court initially finds that the em-
ployee's speech does not in fact involve a matter of public
concern, it will still go on to examine the factors applicable to
the second half of the test's determination of the speech's affects
on the state's interests as an employer.3
By holding that it is unnecessary to examine the reasons for
a public employee's discharge where the speech in question does
not involve a matter of public concern, Connick takes a narrow
27. 461 U.S. at 145-46. Although the Court accurately interprets some of these cases,
see, e.g., Weiman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183; Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961), its interpretation of others is misleading. One of the cases cited by the Court,
Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), involved a state statute that placed burdens on
public employees' freedom of religion. Another case, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
involved a similar statute and dealt with a private citizen rather than a public employee.
28. 461 U.S. at 145.
29. Id. (quoting NAACP v. Clairborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) quot-
ing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)).
30. 461 U.S. at 146 (emphasis added).
31. 391 U.S. at 568.
32. See Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981). See also Schmidt v.
Freemont County School Dist., 558 F.2d 982, 984 (10th Cir. 1977); Clark v. Holmes, 474
F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972; Watts v. Seward School Bd., 454
P.2d 732 (Alaska 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 921 (1970), reh'g denied, 397 U.S. 1071
(1970).
33. See supra note 32.
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approach to the Pickering test. The Court cites two lower court
cases to support its view of Pickering: Clark v. Holmes3 4 and
Schmidt v. Fremont County School District.3 5 However, al-
though these decisions found that the speech involved was not
on a matter of public concern, they both still considered the ef-
fects of the speech on the State's interests as an employer."6
Under Connick, this further inquiry will be unnecessary and the
discharge of the employee would not be questioned, even if the
speech had no effect at all upon the State's interests as an em-
ployer. Such a narrow reading of Pickering is unwarranted and
will have a "chilling effect"' 7 on public employees who want to
speak out on a given subject but are uncertain whether or not it
could be considered a matter of public concern.
34. 474 F.2d 928. In Clark, a nontenured temporary substitute teacher at a state uni-
versity alleged that certain teachers and officials had made false charges against him,
resulting in his not being rehired. The teacher had been involved in disputes with his
superiors and colleagues about the course content and his counseling of students. Id. at
931.
35. 558 F.2d 982 (public school principal alleged that his termination was unconstitu-
tional because it was based on certain statements made by him to the Board of
Education).
36. Both of these cases are clearly distinguishable from Connick. In Clark, "the dis-
ruptive nature of the [employee's] speech was plainly established." McGill v. Board of
Educ. of Pekin Elem. School, 602 F.2d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1979). Myers mentioned this
fact in her brief in opposition to Connick's petition for certiorari. Brief For Appellant at
8. See infra text accompanying notes 131-47 for the significance of actual disruption in
these cases. In Schmidt, the employee was not even discharged in retaliation for his
speech, but rather for "failure to improve the [concerned school's] attendance record and
other inadequacies in his performance." 602 F.2d at 778, n.6. As the trial court in
Schmidt found, "the facts fall short of proving that his indiscrete comments . .. were
the primary and only reasons for his termination." Schmidt relies on the principle, dis-
carded in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, that a statement
made by a public employee in a private forum deserves less first amendment protection
than the same speech if aired in a public forum. See infra text accompanying notes 80-85
for a discussion of Givhan.
37. The phrase "chilling effect" is derived from Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183,
195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This doctrine recognizes the tendency of individuals to
steer well clear of activities which may, under certain circumstances, be prohibited. See
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963) ("The threat of sanctions may deter ...
almost as potently as the actual application of sanction"). See also Keyishian, 385 U.S.
at 604 ("When one must guess what conduct or utterance may lose him his position, one
necessarily will 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone'. .. . The danger of that chilling
effect upon the exercise of vital first amendment rights must be guarded against by sen-
sitive tools which clearly inform [employees] what is being proscribed"). (quoting Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1957)); Pickering v. Board of Education, 381 U.S. at 574
("the threat of dismissal from public employment is . . .a potent means of inhibiting
speech").
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Although the Pickering Court did not define what consti-
tutes "a matter of public concern," it described the speech
before it in a way that implied a broad meaning of the term. The
Court held that the "difference of opinion between Pickering
and the Board as to the preferable manner of operating the
school system" was "clearly" a matter of legitimate public con-
cern. 38 Among the factors the Court found determinative on this
issue were: whether Pickering's expression concerned matters
which were to be determined by popular vote or the judgment of
the school administration; the principle that "free and open de-
bate is vital to informed decision-making by the electorate"; and
the desire to encourage those public employees most likely to
have "informed and definite" opinions on a given subject to
speak out freely "without fear of retaliatory dismissal.
3 9
A broad reading of the term "a matter of public concern" is
further supported by Pickering's use of the New York Times v.
Sullivan 4 standard for determining whether a given statement
is defamatory or libelous. Under the New York Times standard,
a public official can only recover damages for defamation if he
proves that "the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not. 1 The Pickering Court used this
standard to indicate that when a public employee speaks out as
a citizen he should be treated "as the member of the general
public he seeks to be" if it can be shown that "the fact of em-
ployment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the
subject matter" of the statement.42
As the Pickering Court notes, this standard has also been
applied to suits for invasion of privacy where "a matter of public
interest" is involved. s These and other post-New York Times
38. 391 U.S. at 571.
39. Id. at 572.
40. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
41. Id. at 279-80.
42. 391 U.S. at 574.
43. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Cf. REsTATrMENT (SEcoND) oF ToRs
§ 652D(1977):
Publicity Given to Private Life: One who gives publicity to a matter concerning
the private life of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his
privacy, if the matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
1985]
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cases all reveal a liberal interpretation of this term.""
The Court's post-Pickering decisions on the constitutional
rights of public employees give few hints as to the meaning of "a
matter of public concern" in this context.45 Both Board of Re-
44. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), reh'g denied, 389
U.S. 889 (1966) (alleged "fix" of a college football game is a matter of public concern);
Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 704 (S.D. Ga. 1969), aff'd, 426 F.2d 858
(5th Cir. 1970) (high prices charged for public accommodations during a major golf tour-
nament held to be a public issue). See also Comment, The Expanding Constitutional
Protection for the News Media from Liability for Defamation: Predictability and the
New Synthesis, 70 MicH. L. REv. 1547, 1560-62, nn.94-96 (1972) (includes a compilation
of cases involving the issue of what constitutes a matter of public concern).
45. Lower court cases since Pickering are only of limited help in determining what
the Pickering Court meant by "a matter of public concern." Some decisions examine the
content of the employee's statement to see if it involved an elected official, an issue on
which the public voted, or the expenditure of public funds. See, e.g., Hanneman v.
Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 755 (7th Cir. 1976) ("the terms of a collective bargaining agreement
covering municipal police officers may include provisions governing matters of important
public policy" (footnote omitted)); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. No. 58, 477 F.2d
1164, 1167 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973) (the ability of a school dis-
trict to pay higher salaries to its teachers is a matter of public concern); Pilkington v.
Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465, 474 (D.R.I. 1977), aff'd, 590 F.2d (1979) ("[tjhe public has
a legitimate interest in the way public monies are spent [and] the compliance of agencies
with state law"); Watts v. Seward School Board, 454 P.2d 732. Most decisions, however,
merely state that the speech in question was in fact on a matter of public concern and
then proceed to an examination of the factors to be weighed in the second half of the
Pickering balance. See, e.g., McGill v. Board of Educ. of Pekin Elementary School Dist.
No. 108, 602 F.2d 774, 778 n.6; Whitsel v. Southeast Local School Dist., 484 F.2d 1222,
1229 (6th Cir. 1973); Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 312 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd, 445 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1971). A few decisions disregard and even defy Pick-
ering by protecting private conversations by public employees, Hostrop v. Board of Jun-
ior College Dist. No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 492-93 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 967
(1973), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 963 (1976); speech on "matters concerning [the employee's]
employment," Muller v. Conlisk, 429 F.2d 901, 904 (7th Cir. 1970); and speech on issues
only of concern to the employee and his fellow employees. See, e.g., Jannetta v. Cole, 493
F.2d 1334, 1337 n.5 (4th Cir. 1974) ("The First Amendment is not limited in its protec-
tion to issues of great social and political impact, however, and [the employee's] petition
should not be denied such protection simply because it dealt with matters of a local
nature"); Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 481 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S.
955 (1973); Johnson v. Butler, 433 F. Supp. 531, 535 (W.D. Va. 1977) ("The First
Amendment is not restricted to public statements on issues of popular concern but has
been extended to protect private conversations by public employees"); Roberts v. Lake
Central School Corp., 317 F. Supp. 63, 65 (N.D. Ind. 1970). Finally, some decisions hold,
initially, that the speech in question relates to a matter of public concern but then con-
tinue, in dictum, to question the logic of limiting the protection accorded public employ-
ees in this artificial way. See, e.g., Pilkington v. Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. at 478 n.11:
Many matters of great import to the daily work of an agency might not qualify
as matters of general concern or public record but are important to the vital and
accurate functioning of an agency.
COMMENTS
gents v. Roth" and Perry v. Sindermann47 dealt with fourteenth
amendment claims." In Sindermann, however, the Court held
that the teacher's allegations that his nonretention was based on
his public statements on the issue of whether his college should
be elevated to four-year status presented "a bonafide constitu-
tional claim."
49
In Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle"0 the
Court accepted the district court's finding that the concerned
teacher's communication to a local radio station of a memoran-
dum from the school's principal concerning teacher dress and
appearance was a matter of public concern. As Connick notes,
the memorandum was "prompted by the view of some in the
administration that there was a relationship between teacher ap-
pearance and public support for bond issues, and indeed, the ra-
dio station promptly announced the adoption of a dress code as
a news item."5'
In Branti v. Finke 1,52 the Court recognized that the right of
public employees to freedom of belief is as strong as their right
to freedom of speech, and gave the government the additional
burden of proving "an overriding interest . .. of vital impor-
tance . . . requiring that a person's private beliefs conform to
[The employee's] First Amendment rights to speak freely and petition his
government surely include his right qua employee not qua citizen to participate
and express his opinions in his place of work without fear of reprisal-so long, of
course, as he follows the directives of his superiors.
This is a step beyond the facts of Pickering but not beyond the values
which Pickering teaches and the interests which it protects. For Pickering fur-
thers truth-seeking and protects the contribution which those who work, day in
and day out, in the public service can make.
46. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
47. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
48. Sindermann held that "[tihe Fourteenth Amendment does not require opportu-
nity for a hearing prior to the non-renewal of a nontenured state teacher's contract, un-
less he can show that the non-renewal deprives him of an interest in 'liberty' or that he
had 'property' interest in continued employment, despite the lack of tenure or a formal
contract." 408 U.S. at 599. See also id. at 564. Connick cited these two cases for the
proposition that "ordinary dismissals from government service which violate no fixed
tenure or applicable statute or regulation are not subject to judicial review even if the
reasons for the dismissal are alleged to be mistaken or unreasonable." 461 U.S. at 146-47.
49. 408 U.S. at 598.
50. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
51. 461 U.S. at 146.
52. 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
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those of the hiring authority."'53 Although not faced with the is-
sue of the content of speech, the Court in Givhan v. Western
Line Consolidated School District" found that statements
about the school district's racial policies involved a matter of
public concern and were protected speech despite being commu-
nicated to the employer in private rather than through a public
forum. 5
If the definition of the term "a matter of public concern"
was highly ambiguous up to the time of the Connick decision,
such is no longer the case. For in Connick, the Court articulates
and applies a standard judging a given statement by its "con-
tent, form and context" 6 which "impermissibly narrows the
class of subjects on which public employees may speak out with-
out fear of retaliatory dismissal.
'57
The majority in Connick begins its analysis by repeating the
Court's traditional view that the question of whether a public
employee's speech is on a matter of public concern is also the
standard used in judging actions for invasion of privacy.58 How-
ever, the Court's discussion of what matters are of public con-
53. 445 U.S. at 515-16 (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362, 368 (1976)).
54. 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
55. Id. at 415-16. Although the expression in Givhan and Connick was clearly in a
private forum, it is not always easy to differentiate between public and private forums.
Traditionally public forums were limited to public places historically used for discussing
public questions, such as streets and parks. See, e.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
The modern approach is to judge "whether the manner of expression is basically incom-
patible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time." Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972). Under this approach expression has been
protected in such nontraditional public forums as public schools, Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), and municipal theaters, Southeast-
ern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). However, expression in public
transportation facilities, Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), and on
military bases, Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), has been restricted because of a
"basic incompatibility" between "the communication and the primary activity" of the
particular forum. Greer, 424 U.S. at 843 (Powell, J., concurring).
56. 461 U.S. at 147-48.
57. Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 143 n.5. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. The Court cited
Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), for the principle that "action for
invasion of privacy cannot be maintained when the subject-matter of the publicity is [a]
matter of public record." 461 U.S. at 143 n.5. It should be noted that in Cox Broadcast-
ing Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that "[tihe commission of crime, pros-
ecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from the prosecutions, how-
ever, .... are without question events of legitimate concern to the public . Id. at
492.
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cern is "inconsistent with the broad view of that concept articu-
lated in our cases dealing with the constitutional limits on
liability for invasion of privacy.""
The Court states that since "the inquiry into the protected
status of speech is one of law, not fact," 0 it is free to overturn
the district court's finding that "taken as a whole, the issues
presented in the questionnaire relate to the effective functioning
of the District Attorney's office and are matters of public impor-
tance and concern." 61 In reaching its decision, the district court
relied upon Fifth Circuit cases that ruled similar statements
were matters of public concern.2 In particular, the district court
felt that Lindsey v. Board of Regents" was relevant since there
"the court determined that a university professor's submission
of a questionnaire to fellow faculty members regarding the uni-
versity administration's methods of dealing with the faculty was
a matter of 'public importance and concern.""
The decision in Connick does not find it necessary to distin-
guish Lindsey but rather asserts that the district court "erred in
striking the [Pickering] balance" for Myers because it should
have weighed the "context" of the questionnaire, not just its
content and form, in determining whether it involved a matter
of public concern." This inquiry into the "how and where"" of a
59. 461 U.S. at 165-66 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 44-46 and ac-
companying text. The dissent cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToETs § 652D, comment j
(1977):
The scope of a matter of legitimate concern to the public is not limited to
"news," in the sense of reports of current events or activities. It extends also to
the use of names, likenesses or facts in giving information to the public for pur-
poses of education, amusement or enlightenment, when the public may reasona-
bly be expected to have a legitimate interest in what is published.
461 U.S. at 166, n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 652D, comment j (1977)).
60. 461 U.S. at 148 n.7. See Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915, 919 (5th Cir.
1980) for a full discussion in support of this statement.
61. Myers v. Connick, 507 F. Supp. 752, 758.
62. Id. at 758 n.5. These included Bickel v. Burkhart, 632 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1980)
(fireman's criticism of fire department policies, offered at a private meeting arranged by
the department was protected speech) and Kingsville Indep. School Dist. v. Cooper, 611
F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1980) (high school teacher's classroom discussion of post-Civil War
American history, objected to by the school district because it evoked strong student
feelings on racial issues, was protected speech).
63. 607 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979).
64. 507 F. Supp. at 758 n.5.
65. 461 U.S. at 142, 147-48.
66. This is how the Connick dissent defined the term "context" as used by the Con-
nick majority. Id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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given statement is definitely relevant to the second half of the
Pickering test's determination of the effects of the employee's
speech upon the State's interests as an employer.6 7 This is the
first time the Court has indicated that the context of such a
statement should be used in the first half of the Pickering bal-
ance to determine whether the statement is on a matter of pub-
lic concern. This holding directly undermines, if not overrules,
the finding in Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dis-
trict that freedom of speech is not "lost to the public employee
who arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather
than to spread his views before the public.""
Although neither party offered evidence on whether the
questionnaire addressed subjects that were actually matters of
public concern,69 Connick finds that with but one exception,
70
Myers' questions were a "mere extension of [her] dispute over
her transfer to another section of the criminal court" and were
not "of public import in evaluating the performance of the Dis-
trict Attorney as an elected official." 7' The Court does not sup-
port this finding with an inquiry into what the answers to My-
ers' questionnaire might have disclosed.72 It merely assumed
that "the questionnaire, if released to the public, would convey
no information at all other than the fact that a single employee
is upset with the status quo. '73 The Court concluded that "the
67. Private expression, however, may in some situations bring additional factors to
the Pickering calculus. When a government employee personally confronts his immediate
superior, the employing agency's institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by
the content of the employee's message but also by the manner, time and place in which
it is delivered. Givhan at 415 n.4.
68. 439 U.S. at 415-16.
69. 461 U.S. at 160 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. The majority held that the question concerning whether the other Assistant Dis-
trict Attorneys felt pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported
candidates was in fact a matter of public concern. See infra notes 86-88 and accompany-
ing text.
71. 461 U.S. at 148.
72. The district court did not state whether any answered questionnaires were in fact
returned to Myers before she was dismissed. See 507 F. Supp. at 754-55.
73. 461 U.S. at 148. The Court does not attempt to distinguish Pickering on this
point. In Pickering the Court held that the employee's speech was on a matter of public
concern despite the fact that the letter in question "was greeted by everyone but its
main target, the Board [of Education], with massive apathy and total disbelief." Picker-
ing, 391 U.S. at 570.
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focus of Myers' questions is not to evaluate the performance of
the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of




In reaching this conclusion, the Court does not explain why
the answers to the questionnaire would not have helped evaluate
the performance of the office, an issue which it admits is in fact
a matter of public concern.7 5 The Court also does not take notice
of the fact that nine of the thirteen questions did not pertain to
the office's transfer policy, the subject of Myers' controversy
with her superiors. 76 The Court simply concludes that since the
questionnaire admittedly arose in the context of a private disa-
greement between Myers and her employer, and, since its pur-
pose was therefore not to "bring to light" the fact that the "Dis-
trict Attorney's office was not discharging its governmental
responsibilities," it did not involve a matter of public concern.77
On its face, this conclusion seems to explicitly overrule Giv-
han. The Givhan holding expanded the first amendment rights
of public employees by holding that whether a given statement
is judged to be a matter of public concern should not depend on
whether the statement is aired privately or publicly.78 Under
Givhan, the context in which the statement is expressed is a rel-
evant factor only when the speech is deemed a matter of public
concern, at which point it becomes pertinent to the second half
of Pickering's determination of the effects of the statement on
the government's interests as an employer.79
The majority opinion in Connick unsatisfactorily attempts
to distinguish Givhan. The Court claims that although both
statements were expressed in a private forum, Givhan's state-
ment on racial discrimination was "inherently" a matter of pub-
lic concern but Myers' statement on office morale and discipline
was not so because it arose in the context of her disagreement
with her employer.80 The Court thus "suggests that there are
74. 461 U.S. at 148.
75. Id.
76. 507 F. Supp. at 754 n.1.
77. 461 U.S. at 148.
78. 439 U.S. at 415-16.
79. Id. at 415 n.4. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
80. 461 U.S. at 148 n.8. Although the Court had supported its findings by stating that
the questionnaire would convey very little information if released to the public (see
supra note 75 and accompanying text), the Court's note stated that such an inquiry was
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two classes of speech of public concern: statements 'of public im-
port' because of their content, form and context, and statements
that by virtue of their subject matter, are 'inherently of public
concern.' "81 The Court, however, mentions no standard which
makes Givhan's speech "inherently" a matter of public concern
and therefore distinguishable from Myers' speech. The Court
also does not distinguish the fact that the purpose of Givhan's
statements, like Myers', was not to "bring to light" or "inform
the public" that the governmental agency in question "was not
discharging its governmental responsibilities. 8 2 The Court's at-
tempt to distinguish Givhan fails because it sidesteps the find-
ing implicit in Givhan that "[tihe First Amendment affords spe-
cial protection to speech that may inform public debate ...
regardless of whether it actually becomes the subject of a public
controversy. "83
After its attempt to distinguish Givhan, the Court found
that the question on Myers' questionnaire concerning whether
the Assistant District Attorneys felt pressured to work in politi-
cal campaigns on behalf of office-supported candidates was a
matter of public concern. 4 It has long been held that "official
pressure upon [public] employees to work for political candi-
dates not of the worker's own choice constitutes coercion of be-
lief in violation of fundamental constitutional rights." 85 Because
of this principle, the Court singles out the campaign question as
a matter of public concern upon which it is "essential" that pub-
irrelevant because such a public disclosure had not occurred in this case. Id.
81. Id. at 159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. at 148. See supra text accompanying note 79 See also Givhan, 439 U.S. at
415-16.
83. 461 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court's holding produces the
anomalous result that if Myers' questionnaire had in fact been released to the public it
probably would have been deemed a matter of public concern and therefore protected
speech. As the Connick dissent notes, matters affecting the internal operations of the
New Orleans District Attorney's Office "often receive extensive coverage" in the local
newspapers and there was "extensive local press coverage" of Myers' trial and the subse-
quent appeals and petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 160 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 149.
85. Id., citing Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 515-16 (1980) and Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347 (1976). The Court also cited cases supporting the constitutionality of the Hatch
Act, CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330
U.S. 75 (1974), for the proposition "that there is a demonstrated interest in this country
that government service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than politi-
cal service." 461 U.S. at 149.
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lic employees be able to speak "without fear of retaliatory
dismissal."8
The Court fails to point out, however, what makes this
question "inherently""7 a matter of public concern as compared
to the rest of the questionnaire. Certainly it could not be the
context in which the question was aired because all the ques-
tions were expressed in the context of Myers' dispute with her
employer.8 It is true that the Court has accorded public em-
ployees special protection from government acts which infringe
upon the individual's right to freedom of political belief.89 But it
is also true that the Court has given special protection to the
"uninhibited, robust and wide-open" 90 discussion of governmen-
tal affairs by persons both inside and outside of government:
There is practically universal agreement that a major
purpose of [the First] Amendment was the free discus-
sion of governmental affairs. This of course includes dis-
cussions of candidates, structures and forms of govern-
ment, the manner in which government is operated or
should be operated, and all such matters relating to polit-
ical processes.91
Since the Court admits that the performance of an impor-
tant government agency such as a District Attorney's office is
clearly a matter of interest to the voting public, it is hard to
rationalize the Court's holding that Myers' questions about fac-
tors which affect the functioning of that office, such as employee
discipline and morale, are not matters of public concern.2
86. Id.
87. Id. at 148 n.8.
88. See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance
the Connick Court placed on the context of Myers' speech.
89. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
90. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76.
91. Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966), quoted in Connick, 461 U.S. at 161
(Brennan, J., dissenting). In Bush v. Lucas, 103 S. Ct. 2404 (1983), the Court in dictum
stated that "society as well as the individual has an interest in free speech, including 'a
right to disclosure of information about how tax dollars are spent and about the func-
tioning of the government apparatus, an interest in the promotion of the efficiency of the
government, and in the maintenance of an atmosphere of freedom of expression .
Id. at 2407 (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari at F-23-25).
92. 461 U.S. at 147. Cf. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (personnel deci-
sions that adversely affect discipline and morale may ultimately impair an agency's effi-
cient performance of its duties).
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Myers' questionnaire also dealt with matters of public con-
cern when judged by the factors mentioned in Pickering as being
useful for such an inquiry." As with Pickering's expression, My-
ers' statement dealt with issues to be determined by popular
vote, such as the proper expenditures of public funds and the
performance of an elected official. Myers' questionnaire was also
in accord with the policy, expressed in Pickering, of encouraging
public employees with "informed and definite" opinions to
speak out freely "without fear of retaliatory dismissal.
'94
The Court has since reaffirmed its support for this policy in
Madison School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission." There the Court stated that restraining a
teacher's statements at a public meeting of the school board "on
matters involving the operation of the school would seriously im-
pair the board's ability to govern the district."' This decision
also recognized that it is often impossible to neatly classify a
public employee as either a citizen or an employee when making
a given statement, for an employee of government often speaks
"not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned
citizen.
'9 7
Since the Connick Court finds that one of Myers' questions
was made as a citizen speaking on a matter of public concern it
looks to the factors applicable to the second half of the Picker-
ing balance to determine what effect the expression had on the
District Attorney's interests as an employer. In assessing the
weight to be given to each of the pertinent factors, the Court
holds that "the state's burden in justifying a particular dis-
charge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's
expression. ' 98
93. 391 U.S. at 571-72. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
94. Id. at 572.
95. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
96. Id. at 177.
97. Id. at 175 (emphasis added). See supra notes 18 and 43 and accompanying text.
98. 461 U.S. at 147-49. The Court commented that Myers admitted this in her brief
and oral argument before the Court. Id. at 149 n.9. The exact factors applicable to the
second half of the Pickering balance vary from case to case. In Pickering the Court de-
cided not to lay down a general standard for judging all statements (see supra text ac-
companying note 17), but instead indicated factors that nay be relevant in any given
case: whether the expression was directed toward anyone with whom the employee
"would normally be in contact in the course of his daily work"; whether it adversely
affected the maintenance of "either discipline by immediate superiors or harmony among
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The Court does not question the district court's finding that
Myers' questionnaire did not violate a duty of confidentiality or
an office policy.' The Court also accepts the conclusion of the
district court that "Connick has not shown any evidence to indi-
cate that the plaintiff's work performance was adversely affected
by her expression."100 Nonetheless, the Court decides that the
district court did not give enough weight to four factors favoring
the State's interests in regulating the speech of its employees.
These factors are: the "manner, time, and place" in which the
questionnaire was distributed, 101 the overall context in which
Myers' expression and resulting discharge arose, the effect of
Myers' expression on her "close working relationships" with her
superiors, and the disruptive potential of her statements."'
The first two of these factors were only dealt with briefly by
the Court. The inquiry into the "manner, time and place"' 0 3 of
an employee's expression is derived from Givhan's finding that a
statement made in a private setting "may in some situations"
bring up these additional factors which were not relevant in
Pickering because the statements in question there were aired in
a public forum.'04 Although there can be little doubt that this
case presents such a situation, the Court points to no facts to
support its claim "that the functioning of [the District Attor-
ney's] office was endangered"' 0 5 in the three hours between the
co-workers"; whether the concerned employment relationship was "the kind of close
working relationship for which it can persuasively be claimed that personal loyalty and
confidence are necessary for [its] proper functioning"; whether the expression "in any
way either impeded the [employee's] proper performance of his daily duties . . . or...
interfered with the regular operations of the [office] generally"; whether the expression
call[ed] into question [the employee's] fitness to perform his duties"; and whether the
employer could have rebutted without difficulty false statements disclosed to the public
by the employee. 391 U.S. at 569-73.
99. 461 U.S. at 153.
100. 507 F. Supp. at 759.
101. 461 U.S. at 152 (quoting Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4). See supra note 69.
102. 461 U.S. at 151-52.
103. The "manner, time and place" of a particular statement has traditionally been a
key factor in judging whether it is protected under the first amendment. This principle
was first set forth in the late 1930's in such cases as Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)
and Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941) which judged the constitutionality of
municipal ordinances that served to restrict freedom of speech. In Cox, the Court stated
that a municipality has the authority to give consideration to the "time, place and man-
ner" of public speech "in relation to the other proper uses of the streets." Id. at 576.
104. 439 U.S. at 415 n.4. See supra note 69.
105. 461 U.S. at 153.
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time Myers began distributing her questionnaire and the time
she was discharged.106 The Court also sidesteps Givhan's find-
ings that public employee speech on a matter of public concern
should be accorded protection whether aired in a public or pri-
vate forum. The Court distinguishes Pickering, but not Givhan,
by finding that Myers "exercised her rights to speech at the of-
fice" and therefore caused a greater threat to her employer than
Pickering had. 07
The inquiry into the second factor, the overall context in
which an employee's expression and resulting discharge arises, is
derived from the Mt. Healthy' s decision. There the Court held
that a court can find for a discharged employee only if he proves
that his expression was both constitutionally protected under
the Pickering balance and a substantial or motivating factor in
his discharge. The employer must also fail to prove that he
would have discharged the employee even in the absence of the
protected expression.10e The Connick Court accepts the district
court's finding that Myers would not have been discharged if she
had not expressed herself through the questionnaire. The Court
states, however, that since the expression arose in the context of
a "persistent" dispute over office transfer policy, additional
weight should be given to Connick's view that Myers had some-
how threatened his authority to run the office. 0
106. Id. The district court found that Myers did not prepare the questionnaire dur-
ing her working hours and that "a number of the questionnaires" were distributed dur-
ing lunch. Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 754-55. The Connick majority interprets this to mean
that "some" of them were distributed at lunch, 461 U.S. at 153 n.13, while the dissent
states that "most" were distributed at that time. Id. at 166-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The district court made no findings regarding whether any of the questionnaires were in
fact completed by the other Assistant District Attorneys, nor, if they were completed,
whether this was done during working hours as the Connick Court claims to have oc-
curred. Id. at 152.
107. 461 U.S. at 153.
108. Mt. Healthy City Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274.
109. Id. at 287. This has been called the Mt. Healthy "but for" test, Givhan, 439 U.S.
at 417, because a court must conclude that but for the employee's protected speech, he
would not have been discharged by his employer. In Mt. Healthy, the Court was con-
cerned that under the old rule which only considered whether protected activity was a
factor, though not necessarily the only factor in an employee's discharge, the employee
could be placed in "a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally pro-
tected conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing." 429 U.S. at 285.
110. 461 U.S. at 153. It is hard to understand how a dispute that had lasted five days
at the most can be termed "persistent." See 506 F. Supp. 753-54.
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This conclusion alters both the Pickering balancing test and
the Mt. Healthy burden of proof rule in three significant ways.
First, it gives additional weight to the employer's side of the bal-
ance because Myers' questionnaire was not motivated by a
"purely academic interest" but concerned the application of the
disputed office policy to her. In doing this, the Court does not
realize that most employees do not speak out of "academic in-
terest" but rather because of the effect the disputed policy has
on them as employees and citizens."1 Since almost all public
employee speech which results in discharge arises in the context
of some type of disagreement between the employee and the
person or office he works for,1 2 this interpretation of the overall
context of the dispute will always favor the employer.
Second, the Court implies for the first time that even if the
employer cannot prove under the Mt. Healthy rule that he
would have discharged the employee for reasons not related to
the employee's expression, those other reasons become a factor
to be weighed in the Pickering balance in determining if the em-
ployee's speech is constitutionally protected.11 3 This undermines
the holding in Mt. Healthy and Givhan that the unrelated rea-
sons for discharging the employee are not relevant unless the
employee first proves that his speech was constitutionally pro-
tected and therefore an impermissible reason for his dis-
charge.11 4 In Connick, the Court increases the employee's burden
by using the unrelated reasons in determining whether the em-
ployee's speech is protected.
The third factor, which the Connick Court decides the dis-
trict court did not accord due weight, is the effect of Myers' ex-
pression on her close working relationships with her superiors.
This factor has been referred to as an "exception"1'' to Picker-
111. 461 U.S. at 153. By stating that the questionnaire only concerned the applica-
tion of the disputed office policy to Myers, the Court ignores that nine of the thirteen
questions on the questionnaire did not pertain to the transfer policy specifically in dis-
pute. See supra text accompanying note 78.
112. See, e.g., McGill v. Pekin Elementary School Dist. No. 108, 602 F.2d 774 (em-
ployee advocated for a collective bargaining agreement); Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d
750 (disclosure of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement by an employee); Pilk-
ington v. Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465; Roberts v. Lake Central School Corp., 317 F.
Supp. 63.
113. 461 U.S. at 153-54.
114. Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; Givhan, 439 U.S. at 416-17.
115. McKinley v. City of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 1983); Pilkington v.
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ing because there the Court was not faced with "the kind of
close working relationships for which it can persuasively be
claimed that personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to
their proper functioning."' 6 The Pickering Court observed that
it could imagine jobs in the public sector in which "certain forms
of public criticism of the superior by the subordinate would seri-
ously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship
between them."1 17 The Court further stated that "[w]e intimate
no views as to how we would resolve any specific instances of
such situations, but merely note that significantly different con-
siderations would be involved in such cases."" 8
Since Pickering, the Court has not had the opportunity to
outline what these "significantly different considerations" would
be, but some lower courts have mentioned certain factors
thought to be relevant. In Sprague v. Fitzpatrick,"9 the court
held that the district attorney-assistant district attorney rela-
tionship is a "close working relationship" and therefore consid-
ered three additional factors which would not otherwise be rele-
vant to the Pickering balance. 20 These factors were the "need
for loyal and sympathetic employees in positions of discretion,
the need to ensure obedience to state policy, and the need to
prevent impropriety or its appearance."121 Largely because of
these additional considerations, the Sprague court found against
the plaintiff even though he had been discharged in retaliation
for his apparently accurate disclosure to the media that, con-
trary to Fitzpatrick's public statements, Fitzpatrick had recom-
mended that a defendant he had represented in private practice
be given probation instead of a prison term. 22 This decision has
been widely criticized and it is hard to believe that this is the
type of result that the Pickering Court envisioned when it held
Bevilacqua, 439 F. Supp. 465.
116. 391 U.S. at 570.
117. Id. at 570 n.3.
118. Id.
119. 412 F. Supp. 910 (E.D.Pa. 1976), affd, 546 F.2d 560 (3rd Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 937 (1977).
120. Id. at 915. Cf. Lefcourt v. Legal Aid Society, 312 F. Supp. 1105, 1112 (the rela-
tionship between a legal aid staff attorney and his employer is a "close working
relationship").
121. 412 F. Supp. at 915-16 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Nunnery v. Barber, 503
F.2d 1349, 1361 (4th Cir. 1974) (Butzner, J., dissenting)).
122. 412 F. Supp. at 911-12.
[Vol. II
COMMENTS
that discharges involving close working relationships should be
judged by significantly different considerations. 2"
There can be little doubt that "it is important to the effi-
cient and successful operation of the District Attorney's office
for Assistants to maintain close working relationships with their
superiors.' ' 1 4 It may also be true that, as Connick asserts, when
these relationships "are essential to fulfilling public responsibili-
ties, a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is
appropriate.' 25 The Court's holding as to what degree of defer-
ence is appropriate, however, goes well beyond any of its deci-
sions on the first amendment rights of public employees since
the demise of the right/privilege doctrine in the early 1960's.
The Court indicates that the district court did not accord
proper deference to Connick's opinion as to the disruptive effect
of the question which asked whether the Assistants had confi-
dence in and relied upon the word of five named supervisors.ss
As the dissent notes, this is a curious suggestion since the dis-
trict court "explicitly recognized that this was petitioner's 'most
forceful argument'; but after hearing the testimony of four of the
five supervisors named in the question, it found that the ques-
tion had no adverse effect on Myers' relationship with her super-
iors. 1 27 The Connick majority, however, finds that the district
court erred by merely examining this and the other questions for
their actual disruptive effect. The Court thus concludes that the
district court did not accord enough weight to the disruptive po-
tential of Myers' questionnaire."18
Although the other three factors, which the Court claims
the district court failed to give adequate weight to, have been
mentioned in previous Supreme Court decisions, the Court has
never suggested that a public employee can be constitutionally
discharged for engaging in speech on a matter of public concern
because of his employer's "mere apprehension that [the] speech
will be disruptive.""2 Such a standard may be justified when the
123. See, e.g., Note, The Nonpartisan Freedom of Expression of Public Employees,
76 MICH. L. REv. 365, 391-93 (1977).
124. 461 U.S. at 151 (quoting Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 759).
125. 461 U.S. at 151-52.
126. Id. at 153.
127. Id. at 167 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Myers, 507 F. Supp. at 759).
128. 461 U.S. at 153-54.
129. See id. at 166 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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employee's speech threatens to violently disrupt government op-
erations"s0 or is maliciously false as defined by New York Times
v. Sullivan.31 But, where the employee's speech does not ap-
proach these extremes, there does not seem to be any justifica-
tion for using the need for close working relationships as the ba-
sis for the employee's discharge without proof of an actual
impairment of a government interest.
It is true that in Pickering the Court stated that "signifi-
cantly different considerations" would be involved in cases per-
taining to close working relationships.'3 2 But, even these differ-
ent considerations must still be considered in light of the
overriding test of actual disruption used in Pickering and
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict.133 In Pickering the Court emphasized that although Pick-
ering's statements were "critical of his ultimate employer" they
were "neither shown nor can be presumed to have in any way
either impeded [his] proper performance of his daily duties in
the classroom or to have interfered with the regular operation of
the schools generally.'' The Court rejected the school board's
argument that those statements which were false "were per se
harmful to the operation of the schools" and required the school
board to present evidence showing that the letter had actually
harmed the schools."85
A year after Pickering was decided the Court ruled in
Tinker that it was unconstitutional to prohibit high school stu-
dents from wearing black armbands in school to express their
opposition to the Vietnam War.""' School officials had justified
the ban because they feared that the armbands would cause a
disturbance, but the Court held that "in our system, undifferen-
tiated fear or apprehension of a disturbance is not enough to
130. See, e.g., Birdwell v. Hazelwood School Dist., 491 F.2d 490 (8th Cir. 1974).
131. 376 U.S. 254. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
132. 391 U.S. at 570 n.3. See supra text accompanying notes 119-27.
133. 393 U.S. 503.
134. 391 U.S. at 572-73 (footnote omitted).
135. Id. at 571. Furthermore, in Givhan, the Court indicated that the factors to be
weighed in the Pickering balance when the employee's expression is disclosed privately
rather than publicly, such as the "manner, time and place" of the statement's delivery,
are "additional factors" which are to supplement and not to replace the Pickering analy-
sis of whether the expression "interfered with the regular operation" of the governmental
body involved. Givhan, 439 U.S. at 415 n.4 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572-73).
136. 393 U.S. at 508-09.
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overcome the right to freedom of expression. 13 7 Thus, as the
Connick dissent notes,1 38 the Tinker Court concluded that
"where there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the
forbidden conduct would 'materially and substantially interfere
with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation
of the school,' the prohibition cannot be sustained." 3 9
Justice Brennan, dissenting in Connick, states that Tinker
applies to Connick because in both cases "the determination of
the scope of the Constitution's guarantee of freedom of speech
requires consideration of the 'special characteristics of the . ..
environment' in which the expression took place."" 0 The Second
Circuit applied Tinker's material and substantial disruption test
to a case involving a teacher who wore a black armband to
school. Finding insufficient the principal's argument that such
behavior would "tend" to interfere with his job performance and
would "possibly" cause disruption, the court ordered the teacher
reinstated. 141
Furthermore, since Tinker, the vast majority of lower court
decisions involving the discharge of public employees for alleg-
edly unconstitutional reasons have required the employer to
prove that the employee's expression caused or will cause a ma-
terial and substantial disruption to the working environment.
4 2
137. Id. at 508.
138. 461 U.S. at 168-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
139. 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
Burnside held that it was unconstitutional for a school to ban the wearing of protest
buttons by its students. The same day that Burnside was decided, the same panel of the
Fifth Circuit decided Blackwell v. Issaquana County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir.
1966), which defined what constitutes a material and substantial interference with a
given activity. In Blackwell, students wearing buttons were held not to have engaged in
constitutionally protected expression because they "had attempted to force unwilling
students to wear the buttons. When the offending students were ordered to remove their
buttons and cease distributing them in school, they engaged in disruptive activities." See
James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 n.15 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1042 (1972). In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Court applied Tinker's material
and substantial disruption test in holding that a college's non-recognition of a campus
chapter of the Students for a Democratic Society was an unconstitutional infringement
of the freedom of expression and association.
140. 461 U.S. at 168-69 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
141. James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566.
142. See, e.g., Tygrett v. Barry, 627 F.2d 1279, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (defendant must
prove that "the conduct impaired the employee's ability to perform his job or interfered
with the efficient operation of the agency he served"); Janetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334,
1337 (the State must show a "significant interference with the efficient operation of the
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For example, Pilkington v. Bevilacqua143 held that the employer
must show "that the employee's statements either interfered
with the employee's performance of his duties, jeopardized his
relations with his fellow workers, or actually disrupted the oper-
ation of the sector of the government which employed him."'
44
Therefore, the district court which heard Myers' case acted in
harmony with well-established precedent by giving the govern-
ment the burden of clearly demonstrating that her conduct
"substantially interfere[d] with the discharge of duties and re-
sponsibilities inherent in [governmental] employment.'
' 5
The Connick Court does not attempt to distinguish Tinker
or any of the lower court cases applying the material and sub-
stantial disruption requirement to public employee discharges.
Instead, the Court implicitly supports those few lower court
cases which, contrary to Pickering and Tinker, assume without
supporting facts that a certain statement by a public employee
is per se disruptive and therefore not protected.14  The Court
may be justified in holding that there is no "necessity for an
employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disrup-
tion of the office and the destruction of working relationships is
manifest before taking action.' 1 47 However, the Court goes fur-
ther, holding that since Connick "reasonably believed" Myers'
questionnaire would disrupt the office and destroy close working
relationships, the district court's finding that the questionnaire
had not in fact "adversely affected [Myers'] relationship with
her superiors' 48 could be ignored."49 This represents a funda-
mental shift favoring the State's interests under the Pickering
department"); Holodnak v. Avco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 290 (2d Cir. 1974) (employee's
speech could not justify dismissal because it had not interfered with production at defen-
dant's plant), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892 (1975); Hostrop v. Bd. of Junior College, Dist.
No. 515, 471 F.2d 488, 492-93; Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City Bd. of
Educ., 71 Cal.2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723 (1969).
143. 439 F. Supp. 465.
144. Id. at 473-74.
145. 507 F. Supp. at 758 (quoting Schneider v. City of Atlanta, 628 F.2d 915, 919 n.4.
146. See, e.g., Marcum v. Dahl, 658 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1981); Kannisto v. City and
County of San Francisco, 541 F.2d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931
(1977); Roseman v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 520 F.2d 1364, 1368 (3rd Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 921 (1976); Watts v. Seward, 454 P.2d 732, 735.
147. 461 U.S. at 152.
148. 507 F. Supp. at 759.
149. 461 U.S. at 152.
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balance because there will no longer be the need for a trial court
evidentiary determination based on fact, not intuition, that the
feared disruption would actually have occurred.
150
The Court cautions "that a stronger showing [of disruptive
potential] may be necessary if the employee's speech more sub-
stantially involved matters of public concern.",' The majority's
commitment to this principle, however, is questionable because
it had already stated that the one matter of public concern on
Myers' questionnaire was an "essential" issue which should
weigh heavily in the balancing of the competing interests man-
dated by Pickering.
152
The Court cites two cases, Perry Education Association v.
Perry Local Educators' Association s'5  and Greer v. Spock, 5 4 to
support its narrow view of the weight to be accorded the disrup-
tive potential of a public employee's speech. These cases dealt
with public access to school mailboxes and to a military base,
respectively, and though they each held that the state did not
have to offer evidence to support an allegation of potential dis-
ruption, the first amendment issues raised in each were dissimi-
lar to the constitutional issues raised in cases involving the
speech rights of public employees.
155
Connick's holding on the proper weight to be given to the
disruptive potential of a public employee's speech in the Picker-
ing balance evidences a narrow view of the constitutional rights
to be accorded public employees and of the first amendment in
general. The Court's holding disregards the well-established
principle that "a function of free speech under our system is to
150. See Butts v. Dallas Independent School Dist., 436 F.2d 728, 731 (5th Cir. 1971)
(defendant not required to wait until disruption actually occurred, but "what more was
required at least was a determination, based on fact, not intuition, that the expected
disruption would probably result from the exercise of the constitutional right . . .
151. 461 U.S. at 154.
152. Id. at 149.
153. 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983).
154. 424 U.S. 828.
155. In both Perry and Greer, the State's interests as an employer in maintaining the
efficiency of the affected public services was much greater than in Connick. In Perry, the
Court feared that the schools involved would become "battlefield[s] for inter-union
squabbles" if the expression at issue was permitted. 103 S. Ct. at 959. In Greer the Court
held that military loyalty, discipline and morale were such strong State interests that a
military commander could forbid the handing out of publications on a military base if
they might undermine these interests. 424 U.S. at 840.
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invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purposes when
it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with con-
ditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."'' 5 This princi-
ple has been applied by several courts faced with Pickering
problems. In Los Angeles Teachers Union v. Los Angeles City
Board of Education,'57 the court concluded that although the
maintenance of close working relationships among public em-
ployees as discussed in Pickering is a legitimate government ob-
jective "as a general proposition," the "government has no inter-
est in preventing the sort of disharmony which inevitably results
from the mere expression of controversial ideas.'
58
Secondly, by mandating an extreme degree of deference to
the employer's judgment as to the disruptive potential of a pub-
lic employee's speech, the Court is permitting exactly what Pick-
ering prohibited. The Court is condoning the government's use
of "the threat of dismissal from public employment. . . [as] a
potent means of inhibiting speech."' 59 As the Connick dissent
points out, "if the employer's [rather than the court's] judgment
is to be controlling, public employees will not speak out when
what they have to say is critical of their supervisors.' 0
In its conclusion, the Connick Court characterizes Myers'
questionnaire "as an employee grievance concerning office pol-
icy.""" The Court states that since the questionnaire involved
156. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09
("Any word spoken . . . that deviates from the views of another person may start an
argument or cause a disturbance. . . . But our history says that it is this sort of hazard-
ous freedom-this kind of openness-that is the basis of our national strength and of the
independence and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively permissive,
often disputatious society"); James v. Bd. of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 572 ("To preserve the
'market place' of ideas so essential to our system of democracy, we must be willing to
assume the risk of argument and lawful disagreement").
157. 71 Cal.2d 551, 455 P.2d 827, 78 Cal. Rptr. 723.
158. Id. at 561, 455 P.2d at 833, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 729. See also Bush v. Lucas, 103 S.
Ct. 2404, 2407 (1983) (dictum that the employee's speech was protected despite "the
evidence that his statements caused some disruption of the agency's day-to-day rou-
tine"); Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 755 ("At the core of the first amendment is a
preference for debate rather than suppression"); Janetta v. Cole, 493 F.2d 1334, 1337
(even though a petition by a fireman caused "racial tension" and some "lowering of mo-
rale" in the fire department it "occasioned no interference with the operation of the
department" and therefore he was ordered reinstated).
159. 391 U.S. at 574. See also Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 601.
160. 461 U.S. at 168 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 154.
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matters of a public concern "in only a most limited sense" Con-
nick was not required to "tolerate action which he reasonably
believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and
destroy close working relationships. 1 62 As in Pickering, the
Court cautions that it is not laying down a general standard
against which all statements by public employees may be
judged.'" Finally, the Court finds that because this case was
only an "attempt to constitutionalize [an] employee grievance,"
its decision is "no defeat for the First Amendment."' 64
Justice Brennan's dissent finds three major flaws in the
Court's reasoning. According to the dissent, the Court distorts
the Pickering balance by weighing the context of Myers' expres-
sion in determining whether it addressed a matter of public con-
cern, unjustifiably narrows the subjects on which a public em-
ployee may speak without fear of retaliation by employers, and
misapplies the Pickering test by holding that Myers could con-
stitutionally be dismissed "in the absence of evidence that her
conduct disrupted the efficient functioning of the District Attor-
ney's Office."168
Regarding the unjustified narrowing of subjects a public em-
ployee may speak out on, the dissent responds to the majority's
fear that a broad view "would mean that virtually every remark
. . . would plant the seed of a constitutional case"'" by stating
that the proper means to avoid this problem is "not to restrict
artifically the concept of 'public concern,' but to require that ad-
equate weight be given to" the State's interests as an employer
in preserving employee discipline and harmony. 67 The dissent
suggests two major shortcomings with the Court's definition of
"public concern."
162. Id.
163. Id. (quoting 391 U.S. at 569). See supra text accompanying note 17.
164. Id. at 154.
165. Id. at 158 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent's arguments regarding the con-
text and disruptive potential of Myers' expression have been discussed in conjunction
with the analysis of the majority opinion. See supra notes 67-79 and 128-62 and accom-
panying text. (To summarize, the dissent asserts that the context in which a statement is
made should have "nothing whatsoever to do" with the determination of whether the
expression relates to a matter of public concern. On the issue of disruptive potential, the
dissent states that the Court should have applied Tinker's material and substantial dis-
ruption standard rather than deferring so extremely to Connick's "mere apprehension"
of disruption). Id. at 166-70.
166. Id. at 149.
167. Id. at 163-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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The restriction ignores that "a classification that bases the
right to first amendment protection on some estimate of how
much general interest there is in the communication is surely in
conflict with the whole idea of the first amendment."16 Accord-
ing to the dissent, the Court has previously articulated a broad
view of the meaning of "public concern" in harmony with this
concept, where it has had to define the limits of that term's
scope. 169
Secondly, the dissent states that the Court's artificial re-
striction of the concept of "public concern" conflicts with the
first amendment protection of the dissemination of information
so that "the people, not the courts, may evaluate its useful-
ness."170 The majority, by applying its own narrow views of what
matters are of public concern to the statements before it in this
case, fails to recognize that "the citizenry is the final judge of
the proper conduct of public business. 17 1 The dissent also states
that the Court ignores Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc,17 2 where "the
Court referred to the 'difficulty of forcing state and federal
judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address
issues of general or public interest and which do not,' and ex-
pressed doubt [about] the wisdom of committing this task to the
conscience of judges. '"173
168. Id. at 164 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OP EXPRESSION 554 (1970)).
169. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 357
n.6 (1974) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("public affairs must be broadly construed-indeed,
the term may be said to embrace 'any matter of sufficient general interest to prompt
media coverage . . ."'). See also Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 79 (1971)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (Assuming "courts are not simply to take a poll to determine
whether a substantial portion of the population is interested or concerned in a subject,
courts will be required to somehow pass on the legitimacy of interest in a particular
event or subject; what information is relevant to self-government ... all human events
are arguably within the area of 'public or general concern' "); Bridges v. California, 314
U.S. 252, 269 (1941), quoted in Connick, 461 U.S. at 165 n.5 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("No suggestion can be found in the Constitution that the freedom guaranteed for
speech and the press bears an inverse ratio to the timeliness and the importance of the
ideas seeking expression"); Williams v. Bd. of Regents, 629 F.2d 993, 1003 (5th Cir. 1980)
("It has been often stated that First Amendment protection is not dependent upon the
'social worth' of ideas ...").
170. 461 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469, 495).
172. 418 U.S. 323.
173. 461 U.S. at 164 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346).
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The dissent concludes that the district court applied the
correct legal standard in reaching a proper accommodation be-
tween competing interests and that in reversing, the Court is
chilling speech by public employees and thus depriving the pub-
lic of valuable information about the performance of elected
officials.'
74
Connick represents a reversal of an expansive interpretation
of the constitutional protections accorded to public employees.
It is too early to predict the exact effect of Connick on future
cases involving allegedly unconstitutional public employee
speech. Some general effects may be gleaned, however, from the
opinions of the few lower courts that have attempted to inter-
pret and apply the Connick holding.
Such decisions hold that the speech before the court is a
matter of public concern and use Connick as an example of an
individual personnel grievance which does not involve such pro-
tected speech. 7 5 One opinion questions Connick's holding by
stating that "real, or imagined, disruption is required, and the
'close working relationships' exception cannot serve as a pretext
for stifling legitimate speech or penalizing public employees for
expressing unpopular views.' ' 7 6 Other courts, however, have fol-
lowed Connick's lead in artificially restricting the meaning of
"matters of public concern. 17 7 One opinion interprets Connick
as holding that a public employee cannot "bootstrap his individ-
ual grievance into a matter of public concern. . . by invoking a
supposed popular interest in all aspects of the way public insti-
tutions are run.'
78
These contrasting interpretations and applications of Con-
nick expose the decision's fundamental flaw. The Court is justi-
fied in maintaining its support for Pickering's holding that it is
neither appropriate nor feasible to articulate a general standard
against which all critical statements by public employees may be
174. 461 U.S. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
175. Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1229 (11th Cir. 1983); McKinley v. City
of Eloy, 705 F.2d 1110.
176. McKinley, 705 F.2d at 1115.
177. Boyd v. Secretary of the Navy, 709 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1983); Mahaffey v. Kan-
sas Bd. of Regents, 562 F. Supp. 887 (D. Kan. 1983).
178. Mahaffey, 562 F. Supp. at 890.
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judged. However, by incorporating unprecedented and unjusti-
fied ad hoc features into the Pickering balance process, the
Court increases the confusion on the cloudy issue of what types
of public employee speech are protected by the first amendment.
The Court reads Pickering as placing a threshold burden of
proving that the speech in question is in fact a matter of public
concern on the employee. Unless the employee can sustain this
burden, the Court will not inquire into the effects of the speech
on the State's interests as an employer. Given this narrow read-
ing of Pickering, the Court articulates no coherent standard by
which to define the term "matter of public concern." Its holding
that the context of a given statement should be a factor in this
inquiry would seem to explicitly overrule Givhan. Furthermore,
the Court does not mention the standard it used in concluding
that, despite the fact that all the questions on Myers' question-
naire arose in the same context, one of the questions was "inher-
ently" a matter of public concern while the others were not.
Though the Court's opinion definitely narrows the definition of
"matter of public concern," it is still too amorphous a term to be
useful as a judicial principle.
In its application of the Pickering balance the Court is
somewhat clearer about which standards its opinion is based
upon. Its extreme deference, however, to the employer's opinion
on the issue of the disruption caused by the employee's expres-
sion is unjustified and unnecessary. In using the pretext of
"close working relationships" to ignore the district court's find-
ings on this issue, the Court replaces the widely supported ac-
tual disruption standard with an apprehension of potential dis-
ruption standard. This fundamental realigning of the Pickering
balance only serves to place the decision as to what types of ex-
pression will be protected into the hands of the speaker's em-
ployer rather than the more objective judiciary.
The Connick decision undermines sound principles of pub-
lic policy and constitutional law. Whether out of confusion as to
what is a matter of public concern or out of intimidation by the
weight given the employer's opinion, public employees will inevi-
tably be deterred by the Court's decision from making critical
statements about the way government agencies and bodies are
operated. Thus, government improprieties and scandals will not
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be brought to the voting public's attention as frequently.179 Gov-
ernment agencies may not be as responsive to the needs and
grievances of their employees. Government operations will be
cloaked in a shroud of secrecy contrary to the intention of the
Constitution. The Connick decision ignores the underlying prin-
ciple that the first amendment is based on and continues to de-
rive its strength from the belief that the people, not the courts
or the government, possess the right and responsibility to hear
and evaluate the usefulness of any given statement no matter
where, or by whom, it is articulated.
Thomas Mansfield
179. Regarding the public interest in disclosure of government improprieties, Justice
Marshall has stated that "[tihe importance of Government employees' being assured of
their right to freely comment on the conduct of Government, to inform the public of
abuses of power and of the misconduct of their superiors, must be self-evident in these
times." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 228 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also
Kiiskila v. Nichols, 433 F.2d 745, 748-49 (7th Cir. 1970) (criticism of military police by a
former WAC who interacts with many members of armed forces "may be especially val-
ued by society"); Pilarowski v. Brown, 76 Mich. App. 666, 677, 257 N.W.2d 211, 217
(1977) (county employee "was performing a public service" in bringing the questionable
spending policies of the county board of commissioners to public view); Appeal of Chalk,
441 Pa. 376, 384, 272 A.2d 457, 461 (1971) (public assistance caseworker has a unique
and valuable perspective from which to criticize the welfare system). See generally Com-
ment, Government Information Leaks and the First Amendment, 64 CALIF. L. REv. 108,
113-16, 134-45 (1976); Comment, Government Employee Disclosures of Agency Wrong-
doing: Protecting the Right To Blow the Whistle, 42 U. CH. L. REv. 530, 538-41 (1975).
The Connick holding does not take into account the concerns raised in Justice Mar-
shall's Arnett opinion and implies that important disclosures by public employees will
not be adequately protected when weighed against the State's interests in maintaining
the efficiency of the public services. This signals the Court's approval of the dismissal of
public employees in such cases as Sprague v. Fitzpatrick, 412 F. Supp. 910 (where the
employee's "leak" is obviously of great public interest and importance). See supra notes
121-25 and accompanying text.

